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Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to make a sufficient legal 
determination on the record as to the constitutionality of the eyewitness identification. 
Because this issue was not directly raised in the trial court, this Court should review this 
issue for plain error. In reviewing an issue under a plain error standard of review this 
Court must determine whether the error was obvious and prejudicial. State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). This Court reviews the underlying issue presented here 
for correctness: "Whether a trial court is required to make findings of fact and legally 
determine the reliability of an eyewitness identification before admitting such testimony 
is a question of law, which we review for correctness." State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 
943 (Utah App. 1997). 
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2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress the eyewitness identification on 
grounds that it was obtained in violation of Powell's right to due process? This Court 
reviews the facts underlying the trial court's decision for clear error and the trial court's 
legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). This issue 
was preserved for appeal in Powell's Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification (R. 
30). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial due to the failure of the 
prosecution to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to the defendant prior to trial? 
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 
(Utah 1993). This issue was orally preserved in a motion for a mistrial made during trial 
(R. 211 at 174-5). 
4. Whether the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors require a reversal of 
Powell's conviction? This issue involves both questions of law and fact and this Court 
reviews the facts underlying the trial court's decision for clear error and the trial court's 
legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all controlling statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
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' STATEMENT OF?TBM^ 4*SE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Trevor Powell appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fourth 
District Court after being found guilty as charged to Aggravated Robbery, a first degree 
felony under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-302. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Trevor Powell was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court on or about May 17, 2001 with Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of § 76-6-302 Utah Code Annotated (R. 1). 
On July 25, 2001, the Preliminary Hearing was held and Powell was bound-over 
for trial on the charge upon a finding of probable cause (R. 16). 
On August 4, 2001, Powell filed a Motion To Suppress Eyewitness Identification, 
moving the court to suppress 1) the victim's identification of the defendant through 
photo array, 2) the victim's identification of the defendant at the preliminary hearing, and 
3) the victim's identification of the defendant in any jury trial which may occur in the 
future (R. 30). Powell argued that the circumstances surrounding Shelton's identification 
of Powell are of such a nature that the identification is fatally unreliable and therefore 
violates Powell's constitutional rights of due process (R. 27). Shelton identified Powell 
from her memory of both the incident and the photo array (R. 21). The photo array 
depicted only Powell in dark clothing and Powell was the only individual wearing a 
mustache (R. 21). Shelton also originally told the police that the perpetrator was in his 
late 20s to early 30s, but Shelton admitted at the preliminary hearing that Powell's 
appearance is much younger than her original description (R. 20). 
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On August 10, 2001, a hearing was held regarding the motion to suppress 
eyewitness identification (R. 208). The court took the motion under advisement (R. 208: 
21). On August 22, 2001, Powell's motion to suppress eyewitness identification was 
orally denied by the trial court (R. 83; 209 at 2). At trial, Powell renewed his motion to 
suppress and the trial court again orally denied the motion without making any additional 
findings (R. 211 at 167-168). 
On September 6, 2001, a jury trial was held with Judge Bumingham presiding (R. 
211). During the trial, counsel for Powell learned that Shelton, the alleged victim, had 
viewed photo books in an effort to identify the assailant months before trial (R. 211 at 
149). Powell motioned the trial court for a mistrial due to failure of the prosecution to 
provide potentially exculpatory evidence, but the court denied the motion (R. 211 at 174-
5). The trial court also ordered all possible photo books that Shelton could have viewed 
to be sealed (R. 180; 211 at 175). The trial court also indicated that a new trial would be 
granted if exulpatory evidence was discovered in the photo books (R. 211 at 174). After a 
three and a half hour deliberation, the jury found Powell guilty of Aggravated Robbery 
(R. 178, 179). 
On October 17, 2001, Powell was sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years 
to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 185). Powell was also ordered to pay $789 in 
restitution (R. 184). 
On October 19, 2001, the State filed Plaintiffs Notice To Court Of Material 
Review regarding the photo books to see whether Powell's picture was located therein (R. 
188). Neither defense counsel nor State's counsel located Powell's picture among the 
books (R. 187). 
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On November 13, 2001, Powell filed a Motion For A New Trial (R. 195). Powell 
argued that during his trial, potential exculpatory information became known that was 
known by the prosecution but was not provided to the defense prior to the jury trial (R. 
193). During Shelton's testimony at trial, she testified that she went to the police station 
the day after the incident and looked through some books containing photographs in an 
attempt to identify the assailant (R. 192). Shelton testified that she did not identify the 
assailant (R. 192). The court ordered these books to be sealed, but there had been no 
effort to maintain the integrity of the books at the Orem police department during the 
several months since the books were shown to the alleged victim (R. 191). Shelton 
further testified that she worked with an officer and drew a composite sketch of her 
assailant (R. 192). Officer Nielson did not provide the sketch to defense counsel because 
"the investigation had taken a different direction" and the sketch "did not look like the 
defendant" (R. 191-2). The State did not respond to the motion. The trial court never 
ruled on the motion. 
On November 16, 2001, Powell filed his Notice Of Appeal (R. 197). On January 
22, 2002, the case was transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court (R. 203). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On January 8, 2001, Heidi Shelton was working at Perfect Tan in Orem, Utah (R. 
211: 128). A man came into the store and walked up to the counter, pulled down his 
sleeve revealing a knife handle and demanded that Shelton "give me the money" (R. 211 
at 132-3). Shelton testified "I opened the cash register and I just remember the sound of 
it but the money kept dropping off on the floor so I had to keep picking it up and put it 
back on the counter" (R. 211 at 134). The assailant was standing three or four feet from 
5 
Shelton during the incident, and finally grabbed the money and fled, the whole incident 
lasting 3 or 4 minutes (R. 211 at 135-6). 
Shelton contacted the police about 20 seconds after the incident and described the 
assailant as having a sandy brown mustache, about 5 feet 8 inches, of average build, and 
'in his late 20s to early 30s (R. 211 at 84, 131, 137, 147). Shelton alsostated that he was 
wearing a black stocking hat that covered his hair and ears, a black nylon jacket, and blue 
jeans (R. 211 at 131-2). Officer Nielson testified that Shelton did say that the assailant's 
hair was lighter brown and scruffy looking, but Shelton testified that she could not see 
the assailant's hair (R. 211 at 83, 131). 
Four months later, Officer Nielson called Shelton advising her they had a suspect 
and wanted her to view some photographs (R. 211 at 92). Shelton viewed all six photos 
in the lineup at the same time (R. 211 at 153). The only individual in the photo lineup 
that had on a black shirt and had a mustache was the individual in photo #4, Powell (R. 
211 at 154). Powell was also the only individual in the photo lineup that should his 
shoulders, besides one other that was wearing a white shirt (R. 211 at 87-8). Shelton did 
not identify Powell immediately, but "went back and forth" looking at all of the photos 
(R. 211 at 101). After Shelton identified Powell, Officer Nielson told her "this is who 
we actually had in mind of who you just picked" (R. 211 at 155). In the photo lineup, it 
was impossible to distinguish a persons' build or height (R. 211 at 97, 156). 
Both Nielson and Shelton testified that at the preliminary hearing, Powell was the 
only person dressed in an orange jump suit and wearing handcuffs (R. 21; 211 at 96). 
Although Shelton told the police that the assailant was in his late 20s or early 30s, 
Shelton testified that Powell does not look like he is in his late 20s or early 30s (R. 211 at 
157). Shelton said that the assailant had deep set eyes, and that helped her identify 
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Powell, although Shelton did not make this statement to the police in her description of 
the assailant (R. 211 at 82, 138). 
At the end of trial, the Defense discovered on cross-examination that the 
prosecution withheld the following potentially exculpatory information from the Defense 
(R. 211 at 165). The day after the robbery incident, Shelton went to the police station 
and looked at pictures but she was unable to identify anyone (R. 211 at 149, 150). 
Shelton also assisted in making a sketch or a composite drawing of the assailant by 
computer (R. 211 at 161, 164). Shelton testified that the composite computer drawing 
was "as close as I could get him to" (R. 211 at 177). 
Officer Nielson thought the composite sketch was good enough to release to other 
law enforcement agencies (R. 211 at 186-7). But after finding another lead, Nielson 
testified that he did not feel that the composite drawing was relevant because "it didn't 
look like [Powell] at all" (R. 211 at 187). Shelton testified that the composite drawing 
"helped me, actually did refresh my memory" (R. 211 at 163). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Powell asserts that the trial court committed plain error in failing to make 
sufficient legal findings on the record as to the constitutionality of the eyewitness 
identification as required by Utah law. The trial court, considering all the circumstances 
surrounding the identification, is to specifically consider five factors to determine the 
reliability of eyewitness identification. The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
specifically requires courts to make factual findings regarding pre-trial motions on the 
record, and Utah case law specifically requires trial courts to make factual findings on the 
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record concerning motions to suppress eyewitness identification that might be 
constitutionally unreliable. Powell asserts that the trial court made no such findings 
regarding Powell's motion to suppress the eyewitness identification and that this failure 
requires a reversal of his conviction. 
Powell also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
eyewitness testimony because of the suggestiveness of the photo array, the length of time 
between the incident and the identification, and eye witness' discrepancy regarding the 
description of the robber. 
The trial court further erred in denying Powell's motion for a mistrial due to the 
potential exculpatory evidence that was withheld from the Defense. The prosecution 
withheld evidence that the eyewitness victim viewed photo books at the police station the 
day after the incident in an attempt to identify the robber and that she made a composite 
sketch of the assailant. This potential exculpatory evidence was prejudicial to Powell 
because his photo might have been in the books she viewed, but there is no way to tell 
because the integrity of the books was not even partially secured until after trial, almost 
nine months later. 
Finally, if this Court decides that none of these errors are sufficient to require a 
reversal, Powell asserts that the cumulative effects of these errors denied him a fair trial 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE A 
SUFFICIENT LEGAL DETERMINATION ON THE RECORD AS TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
Prior to trial, Powell filed a motion to suppress eyewitness identification on 
August 4, 2001 (R. 30). Although the court held a hearing to consider the motion on 
August 10, 2001, the court did not make a ruling on the motion at that time (R. 208: 21). 
On August 22, 2001, the court denied the motion. Powell asserts that the court failed to 
state sufficient findings on the record as required by Utah law (R. 83; 209 at 2; 211 at 
168). Powell asserts that this failure constitutes plain~or obvious and prejudicial-error. 
Utah case law and Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require that the trial 
court make adequate findings in deciding pre-trial motions. 
Moreover, Utah law requires that the trial court consider five factors when 
determining whether eyewitness testimony is constitutionally reliable. These factors 
were established in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991), and are as follows: 
1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 2) the 
witnesses degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; 3) the witness's 
capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; 4) 
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and 5) the 
nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would 
perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as 
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time 
it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
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Moreover, "Under Ramirez, the trial court must initially determine whether eyewitness 
testimony is constitutionally reliable before it can be admitted." Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944. 
"The court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the identification and 
appraise those circumstances in light of five factors." Id. The court cannot abdicate this 
responsibility by leaving the question to the jury. Id. at 943. "To assume the facts and 
perform the reliability on appeal would eviscerate the Ramirez holding requiring the trial 
courts, as gatekeepers, make the initial determination as to admissibility." Id. 
In State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940 (Utah App. 1997), the defendant was convicted 
of aggravated robbery mainly on the identification of a single witness. Id. at 942. The 
witness, who is Caucasian, claimed to have seen one of her assailants for about 30 
seconds, describing the person as "black," with curly hair, standing five feet six inches 
tall, "nicely dressed . . . not wearing shorts or anything like that," but wearing pants and a 
shirt. Id. at 941. About 20 minutes after the incident, police presented the defendant to 
the witness for identification. Id. at 942. The defendant was "the only woman presented 
for identification . . . . was handcuffed, surrounded by police, placed next to a patrol car, 
and her face illuminated by a flashlight." Id. The defendant is African-American, with 
curly brown hair, and if five feet two inches tall. Id. The witness identified the 
defendant. Id. 
Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the eyewitness identification 
as unreliable under both the Utah and Federal Constitution. Id. At the suppression 
hearing, the defendant was prepared to "proffer expert testimony regarding the reliability 
of eyewitness identification," but the court denied the motion and "made no factual 
findings and made no legal determination as to the constitutional reliability of the 
eyewitness identification." Id. This Court found that "the suppression hearing record 
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shows that the trial court did not make findings as required by Rule 12 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure." Nelson, 950 P.2d at 943. This Court stated, "the trial court's 
failure to make any findings and failure to make any legal determination as to the 
constitutional admissibility of the eyewitness identification testimony was error." Id. at 
944. The court added, "this error was harmful because defendant was convicted 
primarily upon the testimony of the sole witness Thus, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result had the identification not been admitted." Id. This 
Court vacated and remanded for a new trial. Id. 
In a similar procedural case, State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996), the 
defendant's sentence was enhanced under the "gang enhancement" statute, but the trial 
court failed to enter written findings of fact regarding the sentencing enhancement. Id. at 
938-9. The Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court's failure to enter written 
findings of fact regarding the "gang enhancement" provision as required by Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-3-203.1 was plain error. Id. at 941. The Court found that the judge must 
make "discrete, indispensable findings" because these findings "establish the legal basis 
that justifies imposition of the prescribed penalty." Id. at 940. 
As in Nelson and Labrum, Powell's motion to suppress eyewitness identification 
was not properly ruled on or recorded as required by Utah case law and statutory law. 
This Court in Nelson found that trial courts must make its findings on the record to 
satisfy Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding whether eyewitness 
identification testimony is constitutionally reliable before it can be admitted. Nelson, 950 
P.2d at 943, 944. Rule 12(c) provides: "A motion made before trial shall be determined 
before trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later 
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determination. Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall 
state its findings on the record." 
The suppression hearing and pretrial conference records show that the trial court 
did not make the findings required by Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and Utah case law, nor did the trial court consider the five pertinent factors outlined by 
Ramirez (R. 208 at 21). Although the court during trial asked the prosecution to "draft 
the findings and the rulings," no such record exists (R. 211 at 168). 
At the pretrial conference on August 22, 2001, the trial court denied Powell's 
motion to suppress the eyewitness identification, stating: 
I'm going to deny that motion. I have the original here, and all the reasons given 
regarding the dark shirt, there are two others, although their angles are a little 
different, but also are wearing dark shirts. The mustache is not that noticeable. In 
fact, the bottom right person looks like they've even taken the mustache off of 
him. It looks very lighter around his mouth area. The witness that testified had no 
hesitation when she picked out the individual. I looked at this; it does not single 
out any person. I had third parties look at it and I said, "Tell me, does this appear 
- who would you pick if you wanted to from this," and they actually thought that 
the person with the long hair was the one that was more single out than the 
defendant. So I am going to deny the motion to suppress this. 
This was the trial court's complete statement regarding Powell's motion to suppress the 
eyewitness identification. (R. 209: 2). 
The trial court completely failed to enter any findings under the five Ramirez 
factors required by this Court and Utah statutory law. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; 
Nelson, 950 P.2d 940. See also State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). 
Although the trial court partly addressed the fourth factor in Ramirez by stating 
"the witness that testified had no hesitation when she picked out the individual," this 
identification occurred at the preliminary hearing where Powell was the only person in 
12 
the courtroom in handcuffs wearing bright orange inmate clothing and the only person 
sitting at the defense table with the defense attorney (R. 21). 
Also, the trial court failed to consider the remaining aspects under the fourth 
factor: "whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion." The trial judge had 
evidence before him that the witness's testimony was in fact not consistent. The witness 
initially testified that the assailant was in his late 20s to early 30s (R. 21). At the 
preliminary hearing, the witness admitted that Powell did not look to be in his late 20s to 
early 30s (R. 20). The trial court also heard evidence that the identification was the 
product of suggestion (R. 20-1). But the trial court failed to make any findings regarding 
the consistency of the witness's identification and whether it was the product of 
suggestion. 
The findings that the trial court made are erroneous and irrelevant. It appears the 
trial court relied on third parties, asking them which person in the photos appeared to be 
the most singled out (R. 209: 2). The fact that some third party believed that the person 
with long hair was the most singled out is irrelevant to Powell's motion to suppress 
eyewitness identification. The critical issue regarding the photos was whether the photo 
lineup was suggestive to the witness, not to third parties (R. 20-1). The witness had 
testified that her assailant was wearing black clothes and had a mustache (R. 21). Powell 
was the only one in the photo lineup that had on black clothes and was wearing a 
mustache (R. 21). It is irrelevant that some third party considered the individual with 
long hair as the most singled out; the issue was whether the photo lineup was unduly 
suggestive to the witness, not some third party that knows nothing of the assailant. 
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And the limited findings the trial court did make regarding the photo lineup are 
erroneous. First, the court said that "two others" are wearing dark shirts besides Powell 
(R. 209: 2). At the preliminary hearing and at trial, the witness testified that only one 
individual had on black clothes (R. 207: 14; 211 at 154). Upon nearly microscopic 
examination, the photos show a small particle of dark clothing being worn by two other 
individuals, something that the eyewitness failed to notice. Second, the trial court stated, 
"the mustache is not that noticeable" (R. 209: 2). But the witness testified that only the 
defendant was wearing a mustache, and she made no mention that one individual's 
mustache was recently shaved off (R. 207: 13; 211 at 154). Finally, the trial court stated, 
"I looked at this; it does not single out any person" (R. 209: 2). Again, the relevant issue 
before the trial court was whether the photo lineup was suggestive to the witness due to 
the witnesses prior description of the assailant and the suggestive circumstances 
surrounding the photo lineup; the issue was not whether the photo lineup singled out any 
certain individual. 
The fact that the trial court did not look at all the circumstances surrounding the 
eyewitness identification under Ramirez and failed to record the findings on the record as 
required by Rule 12 under Nelson is obvious and prejudicial error. This Court should 
reverse and remand Powell's conviction because Powell was convicted on the testimony 
of one witness, and there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the 
identification not been admitted. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL fiOUitf^ftR^piIN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFI^ATIllTiN ON GROUNDS THAT IT WAS 
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OEl?CJ WELL'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
This issue poses a difficult problem for this Court because the trial court failed to 
make adequate findings, thus denying this Court of its appellate review role. Powell 
asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to due process because the 
circumstances surrounding the eyewitness identification were inherently suggestive and 
because the prosecution failed to introduce potentially exculpatory evidence during the 
preliminary hearing. The prosecution failed to produce the composite drawing that 
Shelton made the day after the incident, thus denying the trial court the opportunity to 
view this discrepancy in Shelton's testimony. 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution grant individuals 
the right to due process. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that this right to due 
process is is central to a determination as to the constitutional reliability of eyewitness 
identification. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991). Moreover, "The 
burden of demonstrating the admissibility of the proffered evidence is on the 
prosecution. It must lay a foundation upon which the trial court can make any necessary 
preliminary factual findings and reach any necessary legal conclusions." Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
After the prosecution has fulfilled its burden, the court takes the role of judge and 
jury: 
In determining whether an identification is reliable, the court must consider "all 
the circumstances" surrounding the identification and appraise those 
circumstances in light of five factors. Based on federal case law, and the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986), the 
Ramirez court established a separate, more indepth [sic] due process analysis of 
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the reliability of eyewitness identifications under the Utah Constitution. In 
determining reliability, a court must consider these pertinent factors: 1) The 
opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 2) the witness's 
degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; 3) the witness's capacity to 
observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; 4) whether the 
witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and 5) the nature of the 
event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, 
remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether 
the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was 
observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 1997), (citations omitted). 
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the defendant was convicted of 
aggravated robbery, and appealed claiming that an eyewitness identification of him was 
unconstitutionally suggestive and unreliable. Id. at 775-6. The facts of Ramirez are as 
follows: Shortly before one o'clock, three people were leaving a Pizza Hut where they 
were accosted and robbed by two men wearing white scarves across their faces. Id. at 
776. One man had a pipe and hit one of the witnesses (Wilson) with it while the other 
assailant held them at gun point. Id. Both robbers fled and the witnesses contacted the 
police. Id. A short time later, an officer that had not yet heard about the robbery 
observed two men walking south in the same neighborhood as the incident. Id. Upon 
seeing the police car, one man fled from sight, so the officer stopped the other man. Id. 
A few minutes later, other officers arrived and when word came that a suspect had been 
detained, the officers with the witnesses told the witnesses that they "had found someone 
who matched the description of one of the robbers." Id. at 777. The identification 
showup then occurred under the following circumstances: 
It was approximately one o'clock in the morning. Ramirez, a dark complexioned 
Apache Indian, was handcuffed to a chain link fence. He was the only suspect 
present and was surrounded by police officers. The police turned the headlights 
and spotlights from the police cars on Ramirez to provide enough light. The 
witnesses viewed Ramirez by looking at him from the back seat of a police car. 
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Of the three witnesses, only Wilson identified Ramirez as the masked man with 
the gun; the other two witnesses were unable to identify him as one of the robbers. 
Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court reviewed these facts and determined that the eyewitness 
idjfc, tification was properly admitted. The Court first considered "the opportunity of the 
witness to view the actor during the event." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. The witness 
testified that he viewed the gunman "a minute" or longer and the distance between them 
was about "ten feet." Id. Although the witness could not see the gunman's face, he 
testified that he "could see enough to know" and that the gunman had small eyes. Id. 
The second factor that the Court considered was the witness's degree of attention 
to the gunmen. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. The Court found that the witness "was fully 
aware that a robbery was taking place." Id. The witness testified that he stared at the 
gunman, trying to get a good description. Id. 
Regarding the third factor, the Court found that although the witness experienced 
a heightened degree of stress, there was nothing in the record to indicate that the witness 
was impaired and unable to view the gunman. Id. 
Under the fourth factor, the Court found that the time between the event and the 
identification was minimal, only being 30 minutes. Id. The court also found 
discrepancies in the witness's identification when the witness testified for the first time at 
trial that he had seen tattoos on the gunman. Id. 
Under the fifth factor, the Court stated that the "blatant suggestiveness of the 
showup is troublesome." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. The witness viewed the gunman 
from the back seat of a police car with remarks of the police officers prior to the showup 
that they had apprehended someone who fit the description of one of the robbers. Id. 
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The Court in Ramirez concluded "having considered all the factors, we find this to 
be an extremely close case," but "considering the facts in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's decision . . . we cannot say that [the] testimony is legally insufficient." Id. 
In the case at bar, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court failed to make 
adequate Ramirez findings on the record, the circumstances surrounding Shelton's 
identification of Powell are unreliable due to the inconsistency of Shelton's 
identification, the suggestiveness surrounding the photo lineup, and the prosecutions 
failure to provide the trial court with all the exculpatory evidence. 
A. Spontaneity and Consistency of Shelton's Identification 
Shelton's description of the assailant and her identification of Powell are 
inconsistent and the product of suggestion. In determining whether the identification 
was spontaneous and remained consistent there after, or whether it was a product of 
suggestion, depends on consideration of the following factors: 
The length of time that passed between the witness's observation at the time of the 
event and the identification of the defendant... the witness's exposure to 
opinions, descriptions, identifications or other information from other sources, 
instances when the witness or other eyewitness to the event failed to identify the 
defendant, instances when the witness or other eyewitness gave a description of 
the actor that is inconsistent with the defendant, and the circumstances under 
which the defendant was presented to the witness for identification. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (citation omitted). 
Unlike Ramirez, where only 30 minutes passed between the witness identification 
of the suspect, four months passed before Shelton identified Powell (R. 21). Also, 
Shelton initially described her assailant in the age range of his late 20s to early 30s (R. 
21). But at the preliminary hearing, Shelton admitted that Powell did not look that age 
(R. 20). 
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Further, Shelton's identification at the preliminary hearing was inherently 
suggestive. Powell was the only person wearing handcuffs, bright orange inmate 
clothing, and the only person sitting with the defense attorney (R. 21). Moreover, when 
asked whether she was identifying Powell form her memory of the incident of from her 
memory of the photo array, Shelton replied she was identifying Powell from both, 
suggesting that Shelton had been influenced by the suggestive photo array prior to her 
identification of Powell in person at the preliminary hearing (R. 21). 
Shelton's identification is unreliable and should have been compressed 
considering the length of time between the incident and the identification, Shelton's 
description to the police about the age of her assailant and the discrepancy in his actual 
age and looks, and the inherent suggestiveness at the preliminary hearing. 
B. Suggestiveness of Photo Lineup 
Shelton's identification of Powell in the photo lineup was the product of 
suggestion. About four months after the incident, Officer Neilson phoned Shelton and 
explained to her "that we had a suspect in mind and I would like her to look at some 
photos" (R. 211 at 92). The photo array included six people, and Powell was the only 
person wearing black clothing and the only person with a mustache (R. 28). 
Nielson testified that Shelton provided a description of her assailant (R. 211 at 
82). Nielson testified that Shelton stated the person was about 5 feet 8 inches and "not 
overweight just average in build and statute" (R. 211 at 82). Nielson testified that 
Shelton did not say anything about the assailant's eyes (R. 211 at 82). Nielson testified 
that Shelton did say that the assailant's hair was "lighter brown" and "scruffy looking," 
but Nielson did not include this statement in his report, even though he stated he would 
certainly want to make a record of that in a police report (R. 211 at 83). Nielson testified 
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that he typed the information into the computer that randomly selected the photo lineup 
(R. 211 at 84). Nielson testified that he typed in the following identifiers: white male, 
age 20 to 30s, brown hair, average build (R. 211 at 84, 97). Nielson testified that at the 
time he typed this information into the computer lineup program, "I already had the 
suspect in mind" (R. 211 at 84). Neilson testified that he did not type into the computer 
that the assailant had a mustache, although Shelton described the individual as having a 
mustache (R. 211 at 84). Nielson testified that if he had typed into the program 
"mustache" as an identifying element, then the photos would have had people with 
mustaches (R. 211 at 84-5). Nielson testified that the photos usually do not have a lot of 
clothing, only a head shot (R. 211 at 85). 
Nielson testified that while looking for five other individuals to include in the 
photo lineup, "You don't want to make a photo lineup with exactly the same, you know, 
even, you know, in my training you don't want to make a photo lineup that every person 
is almost exactly the same to where a person can't identify. I think it is phrased as you 
don't want to make it that somebody who is familiar with that individual can't pick that 
person out of it" (R. 211 at 85). Nielson further testified that none of the individuals in 
the photos had a mustache except for Powell (R. 211 at 86). Nielson also testified that 
the photo of Powell shows his shoulders and that he is wearing a black shirt (R. 211 at 
87). Nielson testified that the other photos do not show any of the other individuals' 
shoulders, except one that was wearing a white shirt (R. 211 at 87-8). 
Nielson testified that he showed the photo lineup to Heidi Shelton and that he 
knew who the suspect was as did the other officer (R. 211 at 73-4, 95). Neilson testified 
that he did the actual speaking and told Shelton "I advised her that the suspect may or 
may not be in that photo lineup.... I asked her to look at it to see if she recognized 
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anybody in the photo lineup.... If she didn't to tell me also and not to pick somebody 
out" (R. 211 at 74, 95). Nelson testified that "before I show them the photo lineup I 
instruct them to look at the photos and if there is something there that is familiar to pick 
that person out, and not to pick any if they are not familiar to them" (R. 211 at 92). 
Nielson testified that he told Shelter "I advised [Shelter] before I came down that we had 
a suspect in mind and I would like her to look at some photos" (R. 211 at 92). Nielson 
testified that he could not remember telling Shelton that it was just as important to clear 
innocent people as it was to find the guilty party (R. 211 at 84). Nielson testified that 
Shelton "went back and forth" looking at all the photos before she picked out Powell (R. 
211 at 101). 
Shelton did not immediately pick out Powell as the suspect, but "went back and 
forth" looking at all the photos before she picked Powell (R. 211 at 101). After she 
picked Powell, Officer Nielson informed her "this is who we actually had in mind" (R. 
211 at 155). 
Although a careful look at the photos reveals that two other individuals in the 
photo are wearing shirts that may be dark, Shelton testified that only one individual in the 
photo lineup had on a dark shirt (R. 211 at 154). 
The suggestiveness of this photo array, including the fact that Shelton testified at 
the preliminary hearing that she could identify Powell because of both her memory and 
the photo array show that Shelton's identification was unreliable and should not have 
been admitted in trial. 
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C. Prosecutions Failure to Present Exculpatory Evidence at the Preliminary 
Hearing 
At trial, the Defense learned for the first time that Shelton went to the police 
station the day after the incident and made a composite sketch of the assailant and also 
reviewed photo books attempting to identify her assailant, but this was unsuccessful (R. 
211 at 137-8, 139, 161). This evidence shows the possibility that Shelton previously 
failed to identify Powell, but because Powell was not aware of this viewing, it is 
impossible to tell. The composite sketch clearly shows the discrepancy in Shelton's 
identification, but again the prosecution's failure to bring forth this evidence denied the 
trial court further grounds to find the identification unreliable. 
Considering all of the circumstances surrounding Shelton's identification of 
Powell at the photo array and at the preliminary hearing, her identification is unreliable 
and the trial court erred in allowing the identification to be admitted at trial. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A MISTRIAL 
DUE TO THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE POTENTIALLY 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE DEFENDANT 
On cross-examination, the Defense discovered that the prosecution withheld 
potential exculpatory evidence, namely that Shelton went to the police station the day 
after the incident and looked at pictures in attempt to identify her assailant (R. 211 at 
149-50). Powell made a motion for a mistrial due to the potential exculpatory evidence 
being withheld, but the court denied the motion (R. 211 at 174-5). A mistrial should 
have been granted because the potentially exculpatory evidence possibly could have 
vindicated Powell. "On appeal from a denial of a motion for mistrial based on 
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prosecutorial misconduct, because the trial court is in the best position to determine an 
alleged error's impact on the proceedings, we will not reverse the trial court's ruling 
absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993). See also State v. 
Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997). In addition, this Court "will reverse on the 
basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if thS, error is 4 bgtantij 1 and prejudicial such that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, thdre would have been a favorable 
result for the defendant." Id. 
"Prosecutors have a duty under both the Utah and United States Constitutions to 
disclose material, exculpatory evidence to the defense." State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 
1|147, 20 P.3d 342. "We hold that fundamental fairness, the touchstone of due process, 
precludes, without limitation, a prosecutor from seeking an unfair advantage over a 
defendant through . . . withholding evidence." State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^ [15, 34 
P.3d 767. 
"Ir rormation known to police officers working on a case is charged to the 
prosecution since the officers are part of the prosecuting team. Neither the prosecutor 
nor officers working on a case may withhold exculpatory evidence or evidence valuable 
to a defendant." State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984). "The important 
question here is whether defendant was prejudiced by the prosecution's failure to 
disclose the [evidence]. For purposes of this question, the good or bad faith of the 
prosecutor is irrelevant. 'If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it 
is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.'" 
Shabata, 678 P.2d at 788 {citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 
2401 (1976)). 
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In State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984), the defendant, convicted of second 
degree murder, argued that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence that denied 
him his right to a fair trial. Id. at 786-7. Prior to the trial, officers informed both the 
prosecution and defense that the state's witness "had some involvement with illicit 
drugs." Id. The defendant had filed a pretrial motion for discovery requesting "the 
plaintiff to inform the defendant of any and all evidence which would exonerate the 
defendant or which would demonstrate the defendant's innocence or be of value to the 
defendant in preparing for trial." Id. The prosecution provided no information about the 
witness pursuant to this request because both parties had the same general knowledge 
before trial. Id. After the trial, "police officers informed both counsel that at some time 
prior to trial, the witness had sold cocaine to an undercover officer and that his arrest was 
imminent." Id. 
The court found that "if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did 
not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed." Shabata, 678 P.2d at 788. 
The court also stated, "if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional 
evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable 
doubt." Id. The court found that the nondisclosure by the police in this situation "adds 
nothing to defendant's case and would not have raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt." 
Id. The court stated that the witness' testimony "came after and mainly corroborated the 
testimony of another prosecution witness, and there was no material variance between the 
testimony of these two witnesses." Id. Thus, the defendant's right to a fair trial was not 
violated. Id. 
In this case, the police officers are clearly part of the prosecution team. See 
Shabata, 678 P.2d at 788. Officer Neilson testified that he did not turn over the evidence 
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to the prosecution because he believed "I didn't feel it was relevant at the time" (R. 211 
at 186). He further testified that he did not believe the composite was relevant because 
"it didn't look like [Powell] at all" (R. 211 at 187). Regardless of Officer Nielson's 
intentions, the prosecution failed to uphold its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to 
the Defense. See Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, f 147. 
Unlike Shabata, the potential exculpatory evidence might have exonerated 
Powell. If the prosecution had not withheld this information, Powell could have taken 
measures to ensure the integrity of the books shown to Shelton. If Powell was in one of 
the photo books, this means that Shelton failed to identify him the day after the incident. 
This would certainly impact the jury and cast reasonable doubt on Shelton's 
identification four months after the incident. 
But Powell was unable to take any steps to ensure the integrity of the photo books. 
There were several pages with spaces where photos may have previously been placed but 
were now missing when defense counsel finally had the opportunity to view the books 
after trial (R. 191). Powell's photo had in fact been taken prior to the robbery incident 
and it could have been in the photo books (R. 211 at 173). 
Powell was convicted solely on Shelton's testimony because the state provided no 
other evidence that linked Powell to the robbery. The only recourse that could have been 
taken to rectify this problem was a new trial as required by Shabata because the integrity 
of the photo books was not ensured creating a reasonable doubt as to Shelton's 
testimony. The trial court erred in denying Powell's motion for a mistrial 
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POINT IV 
THE C ^ l f i l A i W t i JFECT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS 
REQUIRES REVERSAL OF POWELL'S CONVICTION 
If this Court concludes that the errors set forth supra do not individually warrant a 
reversal, Powell asserts that the cumulative effect of the errors requires a reversal of his 
conviction. "Under the cumulative errxk doctrine, we will reverse a conviction only if 
the cumulative effect of several error^undermine our confidence that a fair trial was 
had." State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, ^27, 34 P.3d 187. 
There were numerous errors committed by the trial court which were enlarged by 
the prosecution withholding potential exculpatory information from the defense. First, 
the trial court erred by failing to make sufficient written findings on the record regarding 
Powell's motion to suppress eyewitness identification as required by Ramirez and Rule 
12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Second, the trial court erred by denying the 
motion to suppress the eyewitness identification. Although the identification was 
obtained four months after the incident and the identifications at the photo lineup and 
preliminary hearing were obtained under inherently suggestive conditions, the trial court 
allowed the testimony. Third, the trial court erred by denying Powell's motion for a 
mistrial due to the prosecution withholding potentially exculpatory information from the 
Defense. This information included a composite sketch that looked nothing like Powell 
as well as the possibility that Shelton failed to identify Powell in a previous photo array. 
Powell was convicted solely on Shelton's eyewitness identification that occurred four 
months after the incident. The accumulation of the trial court's error effectively denied 
Powell a fair trial. The combined effect of the prosecution's withholding of evidence 
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and the trial courts error in3admitting the eyewitness identification requires this Court to 
reverse and remaiid the trial court's conviction of Powell. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Powell asks that this Court reverse his conviction of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of August, 2002. 
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xvuie i.z U1AHKULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3 
gotiations as rendering accused's guilty plea Ineffective assistance of counsel: mi* * 
involuntary, 10 A.L.R.4th 689. sentation, or failure to advise, of immiJ2?j 
Retrial on greater offense following reversal consequences of guilty plea — state case* 
of plea-based conviction of lesser offense, 14 A.L.R.4th 719. ^ ^ J l 
A.L.R.4th 970. Guilty plea as affected by fact that s eoJ l 
Use of plea bargain or grant of immunity as contemplated by plea bargain is subsequZS 
improper vouching for credibility of witness — determined to be illegal or unauthorized* 
state cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1229. AL.R.4th 384. ^ ^ 
1 
Rule 12, Motions, 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A raotiJ 
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless thj 
court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upi 
which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported K 
affidavit or by evidence. - ; 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on tlj 
admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial A 
the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The followiil 
shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: i| 
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or infonnjj 
tion other than that it Jails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge a 
offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during tb 
pendency of the proceeding; !. 
(2) motions to suppress evidence; | 
(3) requests for discovery where allowed; $ 
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants;~or "3 
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. ". l 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unles^ <l\ 
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determinatioi 
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the cowt k><l 
state its findings on the record. jj I. * 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to mal 
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court sha 
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief froi 
such waiver. 
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of a 
proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact an 
conclusions of law as are made orally. 
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of tl 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail I 
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a ne 
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affe 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- was declared unconstitutional in State 
ment substituted "to suppress" for "concerning Mendoza, 748 R2d 181 (Utah 1987), on j 
the admissibility of" in Subdivision (b)(2) and basis that the good faith exception to the exd 
deleted "under Rule 9" from the end of Subdi- sionary rule announced in United State* 
vision (b)(4). Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L B 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (g) of this 2d 677 (1984), can never apply to investigate 
rule, which created a good faith exception to the stops and searches. Subdivision (g), altboaj 
exclusion of evidence on the grounds of unlaw- not adopted as part of this rule, remained 
ful search and seizure, was expressly excluded effect as a statutory provision until delett 
from the 1989 adoption of this rule. Subdivision effective April 23,1990, by L. 1990, ch. 15,§ 
(g) [former § 77-35-12(g)] and former §§ 78- Rule 9, cited in Subdivision (b)(4), was i 
16-1 to 78-16-11 substantially comprised the pealed in 1990. For present provisions relat* 
Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act; that act to joinder and severance, see § 77-8a-l. 
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245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
Case No. 011402111 
JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
Comes nowr Trevor Powell, tlirough Richard Gale, his attorney, and hereby moves this 
Court to suppress the following eyewitness identification evidence: 
1. The victim's identification of the defendant through a photo array. 
2. The victim's identification of the defendant at the preliminary hearing. 
3. The victim's identification of the defendant in any jury trial which may occur in the 
future. 
This motion is supported by the attached memorandum. 
Respectfully submitted this^T)/ day of July, 21 
^ c k a r d P. Gale 
Attorney for Defendant 
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JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
FACTS 
1. On January 8, 2001. Heidi Shelton was working at Perfect Tan, a tanning salon located 
at 826 East 800 North in Orem, Utah. (PH, p. 5.) 
2. As Shelton was working she noticed a male individual who walked into the store and 
placed his arms on the counter where she was working. She described the individual as wearing 
a black stocking hat that covered his hair but not his face and a black jacket. (PH p. 6:16-24.) 
3. After approaching Shelton the individual showed Shelton what she believed to be the 
handle of hunting knife which was hidden in the sleeve of his jacket. The individual then stated, 
"give me all the money." (PH 6:24-25; 7:1-6). Shelton attempted to retrieve the money from the 
cash register and place it on the counter. Several times Shelton dropped the money on the floor 
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and had to pick it up. (PH p. 7:7-12). Shelton had not had an experience such as this previously 
and described herself as being scared and frightened. In fact, Shelton dropped the money several 
times because she was nervous. (PH p. 14:18-25; 15:1-6.) 
4. Shelton estimates that the entire time that elapsed from the time the individual entered 
the salon until the time he left was approximately two to three minutes. Shelton believes that she 
looked at the individual's face approximately 10 times during this two the three minute time 
period. (PH p. 14:12-17) 
5. After the individual left with the money, Shelton called the police. Shelton described 
her assailant as a male in his late 20's to early 30's, 5*8" in height, average build, and having a 
sandy brown mustache. (PH p. 17:11-22). 
6. The distinguishing characteristics that Shelton remembered the individual possessing 
were "eyes of that person sinking back into the person's head." and a mustache. (PH p. 13:5-18.) 
7. On May 9, 2001, four months after the robbery occurred, a police officer showed 
Shelton a photo array. (PH p. 11:19-25.) Prior to showing Shelton the photo array, the officer 
told Shelton that they had a suspect in the case and he wanted her to take a look at some pictures 
to see if she recognized anybody. (PH p. 16:11-25.) 
8. The photo array shown to Shelton by police included six people. The defendant was 
the only person in the photo array that was wearing black clothing. The defendant was the only-
person in the photo array with a mustache. (PH p. 13:22-25; 14:1-11) After reviewing the photo 
array Shelton picked the defendant as her assailant. 
9. On July 25, 2001, two and one half months after she was shown the photo array, 
Shelton appeared in Fourth District Court in front of the Honorable Judge Guy R, Burningham 
4 
for defendant's Preliminary Hearing. 
10. At the Preliminary Hearing Shelton was able to see the defendant in shackles walk 
from the jury box to the defense table. The defendant was the only person in the courtroom 
wearing orange jail clothing. The defendant was the only person in the courtroom wearing 
handcuffs. The defendant was the only person in the courtroom sitting next to the defense 
attorney at the defense table. At the Preliminary Hearing Shelton identified the defendant as her 
assailant. (PHp. 15:15-25; 16: 1-10.) 
11. At the Preliminary Hearing the defendant was bound over to stand trial on the 
charges of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING SHELTON'S IDENTIFICATION 
OF THE DEFENDANT ARE OF SUCH A NATURE THAT THE 
IDENTIFICATION IS FATALLY UNRELIABLE AND THEREFORE 
VIOLATES DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE 
PROCESS 
The Supreme Court of the United States and the Utah Supreme Court have both indicated 
that empirical data supports a conclusion that eyewitness identification is inherently unreliable. 
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1926) (''Identification evidence is peculiarly 
riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially. 
Serogate from a fair trial"*; "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals 
of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification"; "The identification of [a] 
stranger is proverbially untrustworthy.") See also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah, 1986) 
('The [scientific] literature is replete with empirical studies documenting the unreliability of 
eyewitness identification"; "The studies all lead inexorably to the conclusion that human 
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perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited and fallible.") See also State v. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) ("People simply do not accurately understand the deleterious 
effects that certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest 
eyewitness, perhaps it is precisely because jurors do not appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness 
testimony that they give such testimony great weight.") The United States Supreme Court is well 
aware that: 
The trial which might determine the accused's fate may well [be] . . . at the 
pretrial confrontation, with the state aligned against the accused, the witness the 
sole jury, and the accused unprotected against the overreaching, intentional or 
unintentional, and with little or no effective appeal from the judgment there 
rendered by the witness - 'that's the man.'" 
United States v. Ash. 413 U.S. 300, 311 (1973) 
Because of the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification, the Utah Supreme Court 
"[is] concerned that law enforcement officials, in an effort to accommodate their heavy 
workloads, might use photo arrays as a substitute for lineups. We strongly discourage this 
practice. We agree with the Michigan Supreme Court that 'a photographic identification, even 
when properly obtained, is clearly inferior to a properly obtained corporeal identification.' 
Consequently, witnesses should be asked to examine photographs only when a proper corporeal 
identification is impossible . . . or difficult." Lopez at 1111. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court clearly encourages corporeal lineups over other 
eyewitness identifications such as "showups," photo arrays, or other identification techniques. 
"We encourage law enforcement officials to consider implementation of [corporeal lineups] and 
to curb the use of photo arrays as much as possible." Lopez, at 1111. See also State v. 
Severance. 828 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1992) (;*. . . a lineup identification is preferable over a showup 
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identification.") 
Even different prosecuting agencies have recognized the fallibility of eyewitness 
testimony. In 1999, The United States Department of Justice published Eyewitness Evidence, A 
Guide for Law Enforcement (October 1999). This document outlines procedures which should 
be followed by law enforcement to ensure that identification procedures are not unduly 
suggestive. As an introduction to the guide former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno stated, 
"Recent cases in which DNA evidence has been used to exonerate individuals 
convicted primarily on the basis of eyewitness testimony have shown us that 
eyewitness evidence in not infallible. Even the most honest and objective people 
can make mistakes . . . In developing its eyewitness evidence procedures, every 
jurisdiction should give careful consideration to the recommendations in this 
Guide . . . 
Eyewitness Evidence, A Guide for Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of Justice, p. iii (1999). 
In the guide's section concerning lineups, among other factors, it is recommended that law 
enforcement personal when composing a photo lineup (1) Select fillers who generally fit the 
witness' description of the perpetrator (i.e. individuals with a mustache) and (2) Create a 
consistent appearance between the suspect and the fillers with respect to any unique or unusual 
feature. When conducting a lineup it is proposed (among other factors) that law enforcement 
personal (1) Instruct the witness that it is just as important to clear innocent persons from 
suspicion as to identify- guilty parties and (2) Instruct the witness that the person who committed 
the crime may or may not be in the set of photographs being presented. 
In Niel v. Biggers, 409, U.S. 188 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that 
procedural due process requires five factors must be considered when assessing the reliability of„ 
out-of-court identifications: 1) The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of 
the crime; 2) The witnesses degree of attention; 3) The accuracy of the witness' prior description 
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of the criminal; 4) The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; 5) The 
length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 
Biggers.atl99. 200. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the factors outlined in Biggers In State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Ramirez requires consideration of the following factors: 
"(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the witness's 
capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) 
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the 
nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would 
perceive remember, and relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as 
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time 
it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's/5 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)). If an eyewitness 
identification is unreliable pursuant to these factors, admission of the identification will deny a 
defendant due process. Id. at 779. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that, when relevant, juries shall be instructed that 
eyewitness identifications are not necessarily reliable and that an articulated set of criteria must 
be considered when determining the reliability of such eyewitness identifications; Long, at 488. 
That such cautionary instruction must be given even if not requested by a party. Long, at 489. 
knd that the prosecution must lay a foundation that an eyewitness identification is 
constitutionally reliable before it can be presented to the jury; Ramirez, at 778. 
It is the responsibility of the trial court to resolve eyewitness identification issues. 
Application of each of the factors in the Ramirez analysis in the instant case supports the 
conclusion that the state should not be allowed to present the eyewitness identification testimony. 
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A. THE WITNESS?S OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW THE ACTOR DURING THE 
EVENT. 
Circumstances to be considered in determining whether a witness had sufficient 
opportunity to view the perpetrator during the event include "the length of time the witness 
viewed the actor; the distance between the witness and the actor; whether the witness could view 
the actor's face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there were distracting noises or activity during 
the observation; and any other circumstances affecting the witness's opportunity to observe the 
actor." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. 
Here, Shelton testified that as she saw an individual wearing a stcking cap come into the 
tanning salon. The individual stood at the counter and remained in the store for two to three 
minutes. Shelton believes she looked at the individual approximately ten times during this time 
period. 
Considering these factors, it appears that Shelton did not have a sufficient opportunity to 
view her assailant. Although Shelton was within close range of her assailant she was more 
focused on retrieving the money which she kept dropping on the floor than she was focused on 
looking at the assailant. Thus, considering the factors set forth in Ramirez, it seems that the 
witness in this matter had an insufficient opportunity to view her assailant. 
B. THE WITNESS'S DEGREE OF ATTENTION TO THE ACTOR AT THE TIME 
OF THE EVENT. 
The witness's attention to the assailant at the time of the event was minimal at best. As 
previously noted, after her assailant made a demand for monry, Shelton was attempting to 
retrieve the money and kept dropping the money on the floor thus had little opportunity to look at 
her assailant. For that reason, Shelton's degree of attention to her assailant at the time of the 
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incident was quite minimal. 
C. THE WITNESS'S CAPACITY TO OBSERVE THE ACTOR DURING THE 
EVENT 
In determining whether a witness had the ability to observe the assailant during the event, 
of particular importance is "whether the witness's capacity to observe was impaired by stress or 
fright at the time of the observation, by personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, by 
uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 
(citing Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8). 
In the present case, Shelton described herself as scared and frightened by the incident. 
Her fright certainly impaired her ability to observe her assailant and remain objective. Moreover, 
the incident occurred at approximately 9:30 in the evening after Shelton had been working 
several hours and would have been fatigued. 
D. SPONTANEITY AND CONSISTENCY OF THE WITNESS'S 
IDENTIFICATION 
In determining whether the identification was spontaneous and remained consistent there 
after, or whether it was a product of suggestion, depends on consideration of the following 
factors: 
the length of time that passed between the witness's observation at the 
time of the event and the identification of the defendant, the witnesses 
mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the identification, the 
witness's exposure to opinions, descriptions, identifications or other 
information from other sources, instances when the witness or other 
eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify the defendant, instances when 
the witness or other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is 
inconsistent with defendant, and the circumstances under which the 
defendant was presented to the witness for identification. 
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Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 783 (citing Long. 721 P.2d at 494 n.8). 
Here, Shelton initially described her assailant as 5'8" tall, with a sandy brown mustache, 
and in the age range of his late 20's to early 30's. At the time she described her assailant, she did 
not appear to have any exposure to opinions or descriptions from other sources. Shelton did not 
identify the defendant as her assailant until more that 5 months had passed since the incident 
occurred. More importantly, the circumstances under which Shelton first identified the 
defendant were highly suggestive. Shelton described her assailant as wearing black clothing and 
having a mustache. Shelton was then shown an array of black and white photos. She was also 
told that the police had a suspect in the case. When Shelton was asked to identify the defendant, 
he was the only person in the photo array wearing black clothing and was the only person in the 
photo array that had a mustache. This procedure of obtaining an identification is inherently 
suggestive. Who else would Shelton identify as her assailant? Someone without a mustache? 
Later, at the Preliminary Hearing, Shelton identified the defendant as her assailant. 
However, similar to her previous identification, the procedure was inherently suggestive. The 
defendant was the only person wearing bright orange inmate clothing, the only person in 
handcuffs, and the only person sitting at the defense table with a defense attorney. Moreover, 
when asked whether she was identifying the defendant from her memory of the incident or from 
tier memory of the photo array, Shelton replied she was identifying the defendant from her 
memory of both the incident and the photo array. This suggests that Shelton had been influenced 
by the suggestive photo array prior to her identification of the defendant in person at the 
Preliminary Hearing. (PHp. 12: 13-15.) 
Additionally, Shelton's description of the defendant immediately following the incident 
I I 
was inconsistent with her identification in the photo array and inconsistent with her identification 
of the defendant in court. Immediately following the incident Shelton described her assailant as 
being in his late 20fs to early 30's. However, defendant's appearance is much younger than 
Shelton's description. Shelton herself admitted at the Preliminary Hearing that the defendant did 
not appear to be in his late 20's or early 30's. (PHp. 17:14-25; 18:1-3.) In light of these 
circumstances, the identification made by Shelton is unreliable. 
E. THE NATURE OF THE EVENT BEING OBSERVED AND THE 
LIKELIHOOD THAT THE WITNESS WOULD PERCEIVE, 
REMEMBER, AND RELATE IT CORRECTLY 
Circumstances relevant to this final factor include "whether the event was an ordinary one 
in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was 
the same as the observer's." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986)). Shelton testified that she was scared, frightened, and nervous. She also testified 
that this kind of event had never happened to her before in her lifetime. Clearly, this incident w.._ 
an exceptional event for Shelton. 
CONCLUSION 
The identification of Defendant as the person accused in this matter is at issue. The 
Stater's case hinges on the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of a single civilian witness and 
will serve as the linchpin ot the prosecution's case in chief. Eyewitness identifications are 
inherently unreliable and require that a jury be instructed to consider particularized criteria when 
assessing the reliability of such identifications. Moreover, human perception is inexact and 
memory is both limited and fallible. Because Shelton's initial identification of the defendant as 
her assailant was so highly suggestive there is no way of guaranteeing that Shelton will identify 
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the defendant as her assailant based on her independent recollection or, as occurred at the 
preliminary hearing, she will identify the defendant as her assailant merely because he happens to 
be sitting in court at defense counsel table. 
Shelton's identifications of the defendant as her assailant are inherently unreliable and 
any subsequent identifications should be suppressed. To permit the admission of Shelton's prior 
identifications and to allow an in-court identification given the unreliability involved in Shelton's 
identifications would deny the defendant due process. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j ? ] day of 
Richard P. Gale 
Attornev for Defendant 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on August 22, 2001) 
3 THE COURT: Trevor Powell. Mr. Powell is present, 
4 This is the time for Pare-trial, and also a time for me to rule 
5 on defense motion to suppress the photo line-up. 
6 I'm going to deny that motion. I have the original 
7 here, and all the reasons given regarding-the dark shirt, there 
8 are two others, although their angles are a little different, 
9 but also are wearing dark shirts. 
10 The mustache is not that noticeable. In fact, the 
11 bottom right person looks like they've even taken the mustache 
12 off of him. It looks very lighter around his mouth area. 
13 The witness that testified had no hesitation when she 
14 picked out the individual. I looked at this; it does not 
15 single out any one person. I had third parties look at it and 
16 I said, "Tell me, does this appear — who would you pick if you 
17 wanted to from this," and they actually thought that the person 
18 with the long hair was the one that was more singled out than 
19 the defendant. 
20 So I1 am going to deny the motion to suppress this. 
* I 
21 Whether or not that makes any difference, we are scheduled for 
22 jury trial on September 6th at 9 a.m. 
23^ MR. GALE: Judge, I don't think that makes a 
24 difference as far as we're concerned with going forward to the 




























at this point. Mr. Larson has filed a motion in limine 















Okay, I haven't seen your response to that 
And Judge, I haven't submitted a response 
So I can't rule 
right? 
Well, obviously, 
on it until I give you a 
Judge, and I think we 
need to set up a hearing for that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do we want to still try to keep 








Yes, he's filed a 120-day disposition. 
So let's — how 
Well, Judge, I'm 
soon can you get your 
going to be out of town 
for the rest of the week. I'm leaving just as soon as I get 
done here. I could probably have it to you— 
THE COURT: You could do it by the 5th of September. 
MR. GALE: Yes, I mean I could have it to you before 
the 5th, Judge— 
THE COURT: Oh, we need to have it — I want to hear 
your arguments on it so— 
MR. GALE: Right. I could have it to you by 
Wednesday, the 29th of August. 
-4-
1 THE COURT: Okay, You file your response by the 29th 
2 of August. What's the other motion that's pending? You said— 
3 MR. GALE: Judge, the other motion is — I filed a 
4 motion to disclose the identify of the— 
5 THE COURT: Oh, yeah, and the State needs to respond 
6 to that one. 
7 MR. LARSON: Judge, we haven't seen that one. 
8 J THE COURT: I have seen it. 
9 MR. GALE: You've got a copy of that? 
10 THE COURT: I've seen it. Let's see, it was filed — 
11 well, I thought I saw it. 
12 COURT CLERK: (Inaudible). 
13 THE COURT: It may still be. I think they just 
14 arrived. I'll ask the State to respond to that motion to 
15 disclose the identity of a confidential informant? 
16 MR. GALE: Well, it's a witness, but a confidential 
17 witness that the State hasn't disclosed. 
18 THE COURT: All right, you respond-now so by August 
19 30th — excuse me, August 29th to that, and then I'll hear your 
20 arguments on both on September 5th. Oh, boy. Can we add one 
21 more to that afternoon? That will make five, I think. One-
22 thirty on September 5th. 
23 MR. GALE: Judge, I don't know if you're willing to go 
24 a little later in the"afternoon on that— 
25 THE COURT: I already have a four-hour prelim set that 
-5-
day, so you're going to be sguoze at the front end of that. 
MR. GALE: Okay. 
THE COURT: If "squoze" is a word. 
MR. LARSON: We can make it a word, your Honor. 
MR. GALE: Judge, we'll need to Mr. Powell to be 
transported from the prison. 
THE COURT: Yes, we need a transportation order for 
September 5th, 1:30. Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
Qtma Dept. of Public Safety 
OFFICER Det Barry hielsen - 01-00930 WITNESS 
NUMBER 
125839/125719 125739/113 IS I "04/125720 
DATE-
mm 
Case Number: 01-93U 
Investigator: nielsen 
Case Number: 01-930 
Investigator: nielsen 
Notes: 
Armed Robbery Suspect from Perfect Tan 826 E. 800 N. 
Case #01-930 
W/M. 5-9 160 Sandy Blonde Hair 28-35 YOA. 
Wearing a black warmup type jacket, black stocking cap and jeans. 
A knife was shown to the victim and the suspect stated to give him all of the 
money. Suspect then fled on foot west bound. 
Contact: Det. Barry T. Nielsen Orem P.D. 229-7256 
